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[40 G.2d 799; 2S6 P.2d 962] 
Because it is my belief that the majority opinion interprets 
the 1947 amendment to section 980 of the Civil Code so nar~ 
rowly as to provide no protection whatever to the products 
of an .author's creative mind and because there is inherent 
therein too strict a test f0r determining the issue of similarity 
between the two productions, I would reverse the entire judg-
ment with directions to the trial court to overrule the de-
murrers and permit the defendants to answer if they· be so 
advised. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 28, 
1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22094. Iu Bank. ~Apr. 29, 1953.] 
.ARTHUR KURLAJ\r, Appellant, v. COLUMBIA BROAD-
CASTING SYSTEM, INC., (a Corporation) et al., Re-
spondents. 
[la, lb] J;.itera,ry :Property~Pleading.-A count .·of a complaint 
whi.ch alleges that plaintiff submitted his radio program to 
defendants at their special instance and request pursuant to 
an express oral agreement that, if they used all or .any part 
of the program, they would pay him its reasonable. value, and 
that defendants accepted submission of the program script 
and recording, became. fully familiar with it, and thereafter, 
without plaintifl;'s authority or license, produced and broadcast 
over a .coast-to-coast network a weekly series o£ programs 
which substantially copied, used and embodied his radio pro-
gram and format to his damage, states. a cause of action, and 
a judgment for defendants entered on an order sustaining 
their demurrers without leave to amend will be reversed with 
directiQn$ to permit defendant$ to answer. 
[2a, 2b] Id.;__Pleading . ...,:.;.A count of a complaint which allege!l 
that plaintiff submitted his radio program .idea and !lam-
pie audition recording to defendants at their request .for 
the purpose of sale to or use by them on . payment to him 
of its reasonable value, and that thereafter they, without plain· 
tiff's ·license or authority, broadca!lt a weekly series of pro-
gr&m!l whi<lh sub!ltantially copied. and used his radio program 
. [lJ See. Oal.Ju.r ., Literary Property; Am . .Tur., Literary Property 
and Copyright, § 112. · 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-4} Literary Property. 
800 KURLAN v. COI.UMBIA BROADCAS'l'ING SYSTEM [ 40 C.2d 
and format to his damage, stateR a cause of action on an im-
plied eontract, and a judgment for defendants entered on an 
order sustaining their demurrers without leave to amend will 
be reversed with direetions to permit defendants to answer. 
[3a, 3b] Id.-Pleading.-A count of a complaint which alleges that 
plaintiff submitted his radio program idea and sample audi-
tion to defendants at their request pursuant to an implied 
agreement that, if used by them, they would pay the reason-
able value of the program idea or any part of it, and that 
thereafter they, without plaintiff's authority or license, broad-
cast a weekly series of programs which substantially copied 
and used his radio program and format to his damage, states 
a cause of action on an implied contract, and a judgment for 
defendants entered on an order sustaining their demurrers 
without leave to amend will be reversed with directions to 
permit defendants to answer. 
[4a, 4b] Id.-Pleading.-A count of a complaint which alleges 
that plaintiff submitted his radio program idea and sample 
audition to defendant::~ at their request pursuant to trade cus-
toms, practices and usages, and that these customs are that 
defendants would not use or copy all or any part of his pro-
gram without his consent and that they would not do or per-
mit any act in derogation of its value, but that thereafter they, 
without plaintiff's license or authority, broadcast a weekly 
series of programs which substantially copied and used his 
radio program and format to his damage, states a cause of 
action on an implied contract, and a judgment for defendants 
entered on an order sustaining their demurrers without leave 
to amend will be reversed with directions to permit defend-
ants to answer. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Allen W. Ashburn, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Action for damages for copying and using a proposed radio 
program owned by plaintiff. Judgment for defendants on 
sustaining demurrers to complaint without leave to amend, 
reversed with directions to permit defendants to answer. 
Fendler, Weber & Lerner, Harold A. Fendler and Daniel 
A. Weber for Appellant. 
Aubrey I. Finn, Pacht, Tannenbaum & Ross, Clore Warne, 
Gordon Stulberg and Maxwell E. Greenberg, as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Appellant. 
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0 'JVIelveny & Myers, Homer I. Mitchell, W. B. Carman 
and Harned Pettus Hoose for Respondents. 
'!'helen, Marrin, ,Johnson & Bridges, Loeb & Loeb, Her-
man F. Selvin and Harry !1. Gershon, as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Respondents. 
EDMONDS, ;J.-Arthur Kurian is f-luing Columbia Broad-
easting System, Inc., and others for damages upon the ground 
that they copied and used a proposed radio program owned 
by him. As in W eitzenkor·n v. Lesser, ante, p. 778 [256 
P.2d 947 J, the appeal is from a judgment entered upon an 
order sustaining the demurrers of the defendants without 
leave to amend. 
[la] For his first cause of action, Kurlan alleges that Ruth 
MeKenney "originated, created and wrote certain stories for 
the 'New Yorker Magazine' which were subsequently drama-
tized in a stage play entitled 'MY SrsTER EILEEN,' and which 
were subsequently used as the basis of a motion picture photo-
play also entitled 'MY SrsTER EILEEN' featuring the same 
leading female characters known as 'Ruth' and 'Eileen,' and 
depicting unique characterizations and relationships between 
said characters.'' He states that, by written agreement, Mc-
Kenney transferred to him "the sole and exclusive right to 
use for radio broadcasting purposes said leading female 
characters.'' She also assigned to him ''all radio broad-
casting rights" which she had "expressly reserved" in con-
nection with prior licenses and uses of these characters. A 
further allegation is that, prior to the commencement of 
this action, McKenney assigned to him all causes of action 
which she might have against these defendants arising out 
of transactions alleged in this complaint. 
K urlan then pleads that he "conceived, originated, and 
devised a new and original radio program idea and original 
untitled radio program'' featuring Ruth and Eileen. In 
eonnection with this program, he states, he originated new 
program techniques and methods of radio presentation, in-
cluding a new radio production format. These, he says. he 
"reduced to concrete form and embodied" in a written script 
and a sample audition recording, at a cost of $10,000, retain-
ing at all times his common law rights of ownership and 
authorship. 
Kurian states that he submitted his radio program to the 
defendants at their special instance and request pursuant to 
40 C.2d-26 
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an express oral agreement. In consideration of such sub-
mission, if they used all or any part of the program they 
promised to pay him its reasonable value. The defendants ac-
cepted submission of the program script and recording, he 
states, heard it, and became fully familiar with it. There-
after, CBS and the other clefen<lants, without Kurian's author-
ity or license, pro<luced and broadcast over a coast-to--coast 
network a weekly series of radio programs entitled, "My 
:B~rien<l Irma.'' This radio broadcast, the complaint continues, 
substantially copied, used and embodied his radio program 
idea an<l format. Kurian claims general damages of $150,000 
for rendering valueless his "personal property." 
[2a] The second count uf the complaint incorporates by 
reference all of the allegations of the first one except the aver-
ments with respect to an express agreement. In addition, it 
declares that Kurlan submitted his radio program idea and 
sample audition recording to the defendants at their request 
for the purpose of sale to or use by them upon payment to 
him of its reasonable value. 
[3a] The third count also incorporates by reference all of 
the allegations of the first one except the averments with respect 
to an express agreement. It then alleges that Kurian sub-
mitted his radio program idea and audition recording to the 
defendants at their request pursuant to an implied agree-
ment that, in consideration for the submission, if used by 
them, they would pay him the reasonable value of the program 
idea, or any part of it. 
[4a] After incorporating by reference all of the allegations 
of the first count except those with respect to an express 
agreement, the fourth count asserts that the radio program 
was submitted to the defendants at their request pursuant 
to trade customs, practices and usages. These customs, the 
complaint declares, are that the defendants would not use 
or copy all or any part of his program without his consent 
and that they would not do or permit any act in derogation of 
its value. 
By reference, all of the allegations of the first count, except 
those respecting an express agreement, use of the program 
by the defendants and damages, are made a part of the fifth 
one. Kurian then pleads that he submitted his program to the 
defendants at their request for the purpose of sale to them. 
They heard the audition recording, he says, and retained it in 
their possession for several weeks, becoming fully familiar 
with its contents. 
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'fhereafter, according to the complaint, the defendants 
negotiated with him for production of a series of radio 
programs based upon his idea. These negotiations, Kurian 
states, were terminated when the defendants informed him 
that they ''intended to use'' his idea, characters and format 
''without compensation therefor by merely changing the names 
of the characters and describing the leading female characters 
as girl friends instead of sisters.'' According to Kurian, the 
defendants said that by doing so they would save the expense 
of compensating him and McKenney and own and control 
the program. Kurian alleges that he immediately objected 
to the proposed action and notified the defendants that they 
would act at their peril. 
Thereafter, Kurian states, with full notice and knowledge 
of his rights and ''in wilful and deliberate disregard thereof,'' 
the defendants broadcast over a coast-to-coast network a 
weekly series of radio programs entitled, "My Friend Irma." 
These programs substantially copied, used, embodied and mis-
appropriated his "untitled and unpublished sample audition 
recording.'' By such conduct, Kurian says, the defendants 
"have appropriated the rights, benefits, royalties and profits 
to which" he "is solely and exclusively entitled," and they 
have destroyed the value of his "personal property." He 
alleges general damages in the amount of $150,000. 
The fifth count includes an allegation that, because of their 
nature, "it is not practicable to attach to the complaint" 
either Kurian's audition recording or recordings of the de-
fendants' radio program. The defendants' recordings are 
in their possession and control, it is said. Kurian makes 
profert of his recording and consents that the records which 
be submitted to the defendants ''shall be deemed to be a part 
of this complaint for all purposes and upon any demurrer, 
motion or other proceeding in this cause.'' By stipulation, 
this allegation was made a part of each of the preceding counts 
of the complaint. 
The defendants demurred to the complaint upon the grounds 
that each count fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a 
cause of action. They also moved to require Kurian to comply 
with section 426 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
The motion to require compliance with the statute was 
granted and the records of both radio programs were ordered 
to be introduced and filed as exhibits on demurrer. There-
after, demurrers were sustained without leave to amend and 
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judgment entered ''that plaintiff take nothing as against said 
defendants.'' 
This court has studied the scripts and heard recordings of 
both radio programs. Kurian's program, "My Sister Eileen," 
features ''the further adventures of Ruth and Eileen,'' the 
principal characters ''from Ruth McKenney's best-selling 
stories and from the Broadway and motion picture hit'' of 
the same name. The principal idea of the program is to 
capitalize upon the success of McKenney's creation. As stated 
in an advertising blurb in the audition script, "Millions of 
people have read the Ruth and Eileen stories or seen the play 
or picture ... which means that several million dollars worth 
of some one else's money has already been spent for you, 
Mr. Prospective Client .... These characters have been highly 
successful in every medium-magazines-books-stage-and 
screen . . . but-as a series have never before been presented 
on the air . . . the medium for which they are best suited." 
The program may be summarized as follows : Ruth and 
Eileen are sisters living in an apartment which Eileen found 
for them in New York City. Ruth possesses average intelli-
gence and capabilities and is the balance wheel of the pair. 
Eileen is semi-moronic, scatterbrained, impulsive, naive, com-
pletely thoughtless and oblivious to the consequences of most 
of her acts. Lucille Ball, a motion picture actress under con-
tract to Kurlan, plays the part of Ruth. 
Ruth, as narrator, introduces a series of incidents in which 
Eileen's stupidity creates situations extremely embarrassing 
to Ruth. Ruth is constantly trying to rescue one or both of 
them from Eileen's scrapes, while Eileen continues to add com-
plications. Through Ruth's efforts, Eileen's situations are 
turned to the benefit of the pair. 
Most of the situations which Eileen creates arise, directly 
or indirectly, from the fact that Eileen is man-crazy. She 
trnsh; any man, and has an astonishing capacity for acquiring 
large numbers of them in unorthodox ways. This trait intro-
duces certain minor characters into the program, including 
one dispossessed male who moves in to live with the girls. 
There is a loud-mouthed Texan boor who, thanks to Eileen, 
forces his crude attentions upon Ruth. Among other char-
acters an; an ec·eentrie old landlady and an ill-tempered canine 
monstrosit.v. Rnth 's bo.v friend, TJ!oyd Carter, is mentioned 
in the audition reeording but his personality is not developed. 
The defendants' program, "My Friend Irma," also features 
two girls, one reasonably intelligent, the other stupid, living 
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--~------
in an apar/.m(mt iu NPw Yoek City. HowevPr, it in 110 way 
attempts to eapit.alizP npon HH~ f-:twer.ss of Md\enney's crea-
tion. ,J anc and Irma arn ehan<·e hieJl(lR, not sisters. Jane, 
for lack of a better place to live, moved into an apartment 
already occupied by Irma. Marie Wilson, a motion picture 
and stage actress farnous for "dumb-blonde" roles, plays the 
part of Irma. 
,Jane, the more intelligent of the two, acts as narrator, intro-
ducing a series of ineidents in which Irma's stupidity creates 
situations extremely embarrassing to one or both girls. Jane, 
however, is totally incapable of coping with the dilemmas 
posed by Irma's antics. With helpless fascination, Jane 
watches the unfolding of each new near-catastrophe. Inevi-
tably, in the most improbable and unexpected manner, each 
situation turns out for the benefit of all concerned. 
Irma is a confirmed ''one-man girl.'' Her boy friend, Al, 
a smooth talking phony, is the third principal character in the 
show. Al, with his schemes, frequently does as much or more 
than Irma to create the uncomfortable situations to which 
the characters are subjected. Jane also is a "one-man girl," 
very much in love with her socialite businessman employer, 
Richard Rhinelander III. Richard is frequently the baffled 
victim of Irma's stupidity and Al 's machinations. Minor 
characters include an avarieious landlady, a burlesque vio-
linist, Riehard 's mother, and a suceession of startlingly uncon-
ventional neighboring tenants and friends of AI. 
Kurlan contends that his complaint tenders issues of faet 
with respeet to aecess, originality, similarity and copying and 
that the trial court erred in deciding these issues upon de-
murrer. He further claims that each count of his complaint 
is well pleadrd and that the trial court erred in sustaining the 
demurrers without leave to amend. The 1947 "procedural" 
amendment to section 426 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
he says, was not intended to prevent jury trials upon the 
merits and did not change the ''substantive'' rule of law that 
issues of faet shall not be determined upon demurrer or motion. 
Another point urged by Kurlan is that the first four counts 
of his complaint, based upon express and implied contract, 
state causes of action which cannot be governed by the prin-
eiples applicable to the tort action of plagiarism. As to the 
fifth count, he declares that the cause of action will lie for 
deliberate taking of his idea and format although no literary 
property is involved. 
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The defendants contend that, under section 426 ( 3), upon 
demurrer, the court must examine the alleged infringed and 
infringing productions and determine whether Kurian's pro-
duction is legally protectible property and whether there is 
any substantial evidence of similarity with respect to such 
property. In determining the issue of originality, they argue, 
the court should apply the doctrine of judicial notice. They 
also contend that the complaint shows upon its face that the 
literary content of Kurian's program previously has been 
published and is, therefore, a part of the public domain. 
Because no legally protectible material was used by them, 
they say, the demurrers to each cause of action were properly 
sustained. In addition, as to the counts upon express and 
implied-in-fact contract, the defendants assert that the alleged 
agreement is within the statute of frauds and unenforceable. 
The preliminary question here, as in W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, 
supra, is : To what actions does section 426 ( 3) of the Code 
of Civil Procedure apply~ Kurian's counsel does not raise this 
point in his briefs. However, it appears from the record that 
the order requiring compliance with section 426 (3) was 
entered over his objection and after argument concerning the 
question. The general rule is "that ordinarily where a party 
has neglected to present a point in his brief he may be pre-
cluded from insisting that the court consider the point when 
deciding the case .... However, we know of no hard-and-fast 
rule which prohibits the court from considering and deciding 
points of law which may not have been urged and argued in 
the briefs originally filed if it appears to the court that an 
important legal principle is necessarily involved in the newly 
discovered point and that a proper disposition of the case 
requires a discussion and decision of that point." (Schubert 
v. Lowe, 193 Cal. 291, 294 [223 P. 550]; Philbrook v. Randall, 
195 Cal. 95, 105 [231 P. 739] .) 
In W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra, it is held that the statute 
applies not only to a tort action for plagiarism but also to 
causes of action for infringement of related contract rights. 
Therefore, the order of the trial court making the records of 
both radio programs a part of the complaint affects all five 
alleged causes of action and a comparison of the productions 
must be made in considering each count. 
Kurian contends that the statute cannot and does not de-
prive him of his right to a jury trial of issues of fact with 
respect to access, originality, similarity and copying. As 
held in W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra, the statute provides a 
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method for considering the alleged infringed and infringing 
productions upon demurrer. This in no way deprives a plain-
tiff of his right to a jury trial. If, from a comparison of the 
productions, a question of fact is shown to exist, the cause 
should be submitted to the jury. 
· The defendants argue that the court may take judicial 
notice of the contents of published books and playc;; and of 
former and contemporary radio programs in determining 
whether Kurian's claim of originality is well founded. For the 
reasons stated in the W eitzenkorn case, the court cannot do so. 
However, Kurland has alleged facts which negative original-
ity as to the major portion of his production. He states that 
"My Sister Eileen" featuring the characters "Ruth" and 
''Eileen'' and ''depicting unique characterizations and rela-
tionships between said characters'' was originated, created and 
written by Ruth McKenney for the "New Yorker Magazine." 
The audition recording which Kurian has attached to his com-
plaint also states that the story has been published in books . 
.According to the recording, "Millions of people have read the 
Ruth and Eileen stories.'' 
.At the time Kurian's cause of action arose, section 983 of 
the Civil Code declared: ''If the owner of a product of the 
mind intentionally makes it public, a copy or reproduction 
may be made public by any person, without responsibility 
to the owner, so far as the law of this state is concerned.'' 
Section 980 of the same code, as then in effect, provided that, 
''The author of any product of the mind, . . . has an exclusive 
ownership therein, and in the representation or expression 
thereof, which continues so long as the product and the repre-
sentations or expressions thereof made by him remain in his 
possession.·'' 
Kurian's complaint shows that any property interest which 
McKenney may have had in either the story or characters of 
''My Sister Eileen'' has been lost by publication. .According 
to the pleader, neither the product of McKenney's mind nor 
its representations or expressions remain in her possession. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, there is no protectible prop-
erty in the "basic dramatic core" of the story, its characters 
and their relationships, or the form and manner of its ex-
pression. 
It is suggested, however, that McKenney retained the right 
to use the characters "Ruth" and "Eileen" in sequels to the 
original stories. The implication is that no one else could 
acquire this right. But even if we assume that characteriza-
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tions may be protectible, these characters' were products of the 
mind which intentionally had been made public. Under the 
circumstances, there was nothing to prevent McKenney or 
anyone else from utilizing them in other productions. 
The program incorporated in the complaint declares that it 
features'' the further adventures of Ruth and Eileen.'' There-
fore, we must assume for the purposes of the demurrers that 
the story is a sequel to, and not a reproduction of, McKenney's 
literary creation, which is not before the court and the con-
tents of which we cannot judicially notice. Even though the 
dramatic core of Kurian's production, together with its two 
principal characters, their relationships, and its locale, are 
unoriginal under the allegations of the pleading, neither its 
style and manner of expression nor its minor characters can 
be held, upon demurrer, to lack originality as a matter of 
law. (Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra.) 
In addition to his allegation that he created an ''original 
untitled radio program," Kurian claims to have "devised a 
new and original radio program idea" for which he "origi-
nated, created and devised . . . new program techniques and 
methods of radio presentation . . . including a new radio 
production format.'' In that regard, this case is similar to 
Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 653 
[221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216], and Kovacs v. Mutual Broad-
cast1:ng System, Inc., 99 Cal.App.2d 56 [221 P.2d 108], where 
the claimed protectible property was a "radio program idea" 
rather than the traditional conception of ''literary property.'' 
Under the rules stated and applied in deciding those cases, 
for Kurian to have a protectible interest in his radio program 
idea as reduced to a production format, he must establish 
both originality and novelty. 
Kurian's radio program idea was to capitalize upon a famous 
and successful story, play and motion picture by producing 
it on the radio. The court may take judicial notice of thr 
fact that there is nothing new and novel in this idea which 
might constitute protectible property. (Stanley v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc., supra, p. 663.) Whether there is 
any originality or novelty in Kurian's "new program tech-
niques and methods of radio presentation'' is more difficult 
to determine. There is nothing novel about customary broad-
casting techniques, but the court cannot have judicial knowl-
edge of all of the methods of the highly complicated radio in-
dustry. It might be possible for Kurian to show that he cre-
ated something novel in the way of program techniques and 
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methods of presentation. Because extrinic evidence is required 
to prove whether thflre is any element of novelty in his pro-
gram techniques, it cannot be determinfld upon demurrer, 
that there is no protectible property in them. Insofar as the 
question of a lack of originality or novelty may be involved 
in each cause of action, the demurrers could not properly have 
been sustained solely upon that ground. 
The next question for decision is that of similarity. Access 
and inclination to copy being admitted by the demurrer, then 
if it may be said that some substantial similarity between 
the programs reasonably could be found, the issues of 
similarity and of copying are to be determined by the trier 
of fact. Having both programs before it upon demurrer 
in accordance with section 426(3), the court may determine 
whether there is substantial similarity between them. ( W eitze·n-
korn v. Lesser, snprn.) If, as a matter of law, there is no 
such similarity, then there is no question of fact and the 
demurrers to each count of the complaint were properly 
sustained. 
In order for the fifth count of the complaint to state a 
cause of action for plagiarism, there must be some substan-
tial similarity between the defendants' radio program and 
protectible portions of Kurian's production. ( W eitzenkorn y 
Lesser, supm.) Even if it might be found that there is some 
originality in the development of minor characters which 
Kurian may have added to McKenney's story for the purposes 
of the radio program, there is no similarity between them and 
characters in the defendants' program. Nor is there any simi-
larity between the two shows as to the form and manner of 
expression of their literary content. However, some similarity 
might be found in the methods of program presentation and 
radio techniques. Because evidence may tend to prove that 
Kurian's program format was both original and novel, the 
demurrers to the fifth cause of action were improperly sus-
tained. 
'l'he defendants strike directly at the heart of Kurian's other 
claims by asserting that the complaint charges only the breach 
of an express, or an implied-in-fact, contract to pay for a 
''new and original'' radio program, if used. They argue that, 
both from the allegations of the complaint and from the 
audition program itself, it appears, as a matter of law, that 
the program is neither original nor novel. Therefore, they 
say, no cause of action is stated upon an express or implied-
in-fact contract. 
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However, as previously stated, it cannot be determined 
upon demurrer in the absence of evidence of previously pub-
lished works that there is nothing original in the literary 
content of the program or that the radio production techniques 
utilized lack novelty. Nor may the complaint be construed 
so narrowly as suggested. by the defendants. In substance, it 
alleges that Kurian created a new and original radio program 
which he submitted to the defendants in return for their 
promise, express or implied, to pay ''the reasonable value 
thereof" if they used it. Although Kurian has described his 
production as a new and original program, he does not allege 
that he represented it to the defendants as such. Also, there is 
no allegation that the agreement was conditioned upon Kur-
Ian's production's being new and original. The pleading allows 
Kurian to present evidence, if there be such, tending to prove 
a promise, express or implied in fact, to pay for the use of 
his program whether or not it is original. 
For this reason, and in accordance with the rule stated in 
W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra, the question of protectibility 
need not be considered in determining the sufficiency of the 
allegations of the first count of the complaint, based upon 
express contract. Kurian may be able to present evidence 
showing some similarity between the program techniques. 
In addition, although there is no similarity between protec-
tible portions of the literary content of Kurian's program and 
the defendants' broadcasts, there is the possibility of finding 
some similarity in the use by each production of a ''dumb'' 
character who produces difficult situations for a "smart" 
character, both being girls who share an apartment in New 
York City. The terms of the contract and the content of the 
programs present questions of fact for the jury as to the 
contractual provisions, access, similarity, and copying. 
However, the defendants argue that, even if the cause of 
action upon express contract otherwise is well pleaded, the 
demurrers to it properly were sustained because the com-
plaint shows on its face that the contract is within the bar 
of the statute of frauds. Even if it be assumed that the 
transaction alleged might be said to be a sale of "goods" 
within section 1624a of the Civil Code, the complaint, upon 
its face, does not show the bar of the statute. A transaction 
is removed from the statute by acceptance of part of the goods 
received. "There is an acceptance of goods ... when the 
buyer, either before or after delivery of the goods, expresses 
by words or conduct his assent to becoming the owner of those 
Apr. 1953] KuRLAN v. CoLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM 811 
[40 C.2d 799; 256 P.2d 962] 
specific goods." (§ 1624a[3].) Kurian alleges facts from 
which access, copying and use conceivably could be found. 
If such findings were made, acceptance of at least a portion 
of the goods received would be proved and the statute would 
constitute no bar to the action. [lb] Under the circumstances, 
the facts pleaded in the first count are sufficient to state a cause 
of action and the demurrers thereto were improperly sus-
tained. 
[2b, 3b] The second and third counts of the complaint are 
based upon the common count of quantum valebant and are 
sufficient to state a cause of action upon either a contract im-
plied in fact or one implied in law. (Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 
supra.) As stated in theW eitzenkorn case, ''Although it is un-
necessary for the pleading to distinguish between the contract 
implied in fact and the contract implied in law, or quasi con-
tract, the elements which must be proved for recovery upon 
each of them are quite different.'' Here, it might be possible 
for Kurian to recover upon either a contract implied in fact or 
one implied in law. Under the first theory, the required proof 
is essentially the same as that for the count upon express con-
tract, with the exception that conduct, rather than words of 
promise, must be proved from which the promise may be im-
plied. On the other hand, if Kurian relies upon a contract 
implied in law, the proof necessary for a recovery is the same 
as that required by the tort action for plagiarism. For these 
reasons, the demurrers to the second and third counts of the 
complaint should have been overruled. 
[4b] The fourth count relies upon a contract implied in 
fact from trade customs, practices and usages. The conclusions 
in regard to the count upon express contract are equally 
applicable to this count and the demurrers thereto were im-
properly sustained. 
These conclusions make it unnecessary to consider Kurian's 
contention that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court 
to have sustained the general demurrers to all five causes of 
action without leave to amend. 
The judgment is reversed as to each cause of action with 
directions to permit the defendants to answer. 
Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, ,J.-I concur in the judgment and with all that 
portion of the opinion which is not inconsistent with the views 
expressed by me in Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc. (1950), 
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:35 Cal.2d 690, 710 [221 P.2d 95] ; in Stanley v. Ool1~rnbia 
Broadc~asting Systern, In,c. (1950), 35 Cal.2d 653, 668 [221 
P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216] ; and in Burtis v. Universal Pic-
tures Co., Inc., post, p. 823 [256 P.2d 933]. 
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-Plaintiff seeks 
recovery for the alleged unauthorized use of his plan for a 
radio program to consist in the serialized presentation of the 
adventures of two sisters living in a New York apartment. 
He reduced his plan to concrete form by preparing a script 
and audition of one Rample program and submitted it to de-
fendants. He allegeR that they made use of his program 
by producing "My Friend Irma," and that either under the 
terms of an express or implied contract, or by virtue of piracy 
of his literary property, he is entitled to recover damages for 
such use. The majority opinion holds that he has stated causes 
of action both for breach of contract and for plagiarism. 
Since in my opinion plaintiff has not alleged facts, which if 
proved, would establish infringement of his literary property, 
I cannot agree with the latter holding. 
Plaintiff's program may be divided into three elements. 
'l'here is the raw material consisting of the two principal 
characters, the basic relationship between them, and the locale 
of their adventures. . Since this material was taken from the 
published works of Ruth McKenney, it could in no event con-
stitute protectible literary property under the law of this state. 
( Civ. Code, § 983.) Accordingly, it is unnecessary to decide 
whether it constituted merely some of the basic ideas embodied 
in the program, or would, had it not been previously published, 
eonstitute a sufficient development and treatment of basic 
ideas to be the subject of copyright protection. (See Golding 
Y. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690, 701 [221 P.2d 95], 
diso;ent, and cases and authorities there cited.) 
Using McKenney's material, plaintiff produced his sample 
program in which he presented one adventure of the two 
:-;isters. Although he cannot claim copyright protection under 
the law of this state for McKenney's material or for the ideas 
he may have added to it, he is entitled to protection for any 
original treatment and development he has given to such 
material and ideas. I agree with the holding of the court, 
however, that insofar as the dramatic content of the sample 
program is concerned, there is no similarity between plaintiff's 
original contributions and defendants' program. Such similar-
ity as does exist in this respect arises only from the common 
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nse of thr basie drarnati<~ sitnation found in the MeKenney 
works, and aeeordingly, will not support a finding of piracy. 
(Golding v. R.K.O. P1~cturcs, Inc., 35 Ca1.2d 690, 695-696 
l221 P.2d 95].) 
rrhe third element of plaintiff's program is its basic plan as 
<listinet from the specific episode or adventure presented as a 
sample or illustration thereof. 'l'he plan or format consists 
of a eombination of the following ideas : the use of the Mc-
Kenney material as the basis for a serialized radio program; 
the use of first person narration by the intelligent sister to set 
the stage and bridge the gaps between the scenes in each 
program; and the use of the principal characters to carry over 
listener interest from week to week. It may be assumed that 
this combination of ideas was original with plaintiff. More-
over, although there is nothing new or novel about any one of 
these ideas, it may be assumed that they had not been com-
bined in the same manner in any earlier radio program. It 
does not follow, however, that this combination of ideas con-
stitutes protectible intellectual property. The basic program 
plan adopted as the foundation for a radio serial is analogous 
to the basic dramatic core or plot of a play or movie. It 
consists only of the author's general ideas as distinct from his 
original treatment or development of them. Such general ideas 
are free and cannot constitute property. (See Golding v. 
R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690, 701 [221 P.2d 95], 
dissent; Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 
Cal.2d 653, 672 [221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216], dissent.) 
In W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, ante, p. 778 [256 P.2d 947], 
the court holds that since the 1947 amendment to Civil Code, 
section 980, ideas, as distinct from the original form and 
manner of their expression, do not constitute literary property 
in this state. It justifies the protection against plagiarism 
that was given to the basic dramatic core of plaintiffs' play 
in Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., 35 Oal.2d 690 [221 P.2d 
95], and to the radio program idea in Stanley v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 Oal.2d 653 [221 P.2d 73, 23 
A.L.R.2d 216), on the ground that 'rin its earlier form, the 
statute expressly protected both the idea, the 'product of the 
mind,' and 'the representation or expression thereof.' " Since 
in the present case the cause of action arose before the statute 
was amended, the court follows the Stanley and Golding 
cases in treating plaintiff's radio program idea as protectible 
literary property. 
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As it was originally enacted, Civil Code, section 9801 , re-
ferred generally to ''any product of the mind,'' and then 
listed the different types of intellectual property that might 
exist. Among those listed was ''a composition in letters or 
art,'' and protection was extended not only to the product 
itself, that is, to the composition in letters or art, but also 
to any representation or expression thereof. Thus protection 
was not limited to the exact literary composition created by 
the author, but extended to other and different representa-
tions and expressions that might be copied therefrom. Under 
its terms, however, the protection existed only so long ''as the 
product and the representation or expression thereof" re-
mained in the author's possession. It was thus arguable that 
the common law copyrights in a literary composition might 
be lost by a transfer of possession of the manuscript even with-
out actual publication. 
In 1947 the statute was amended to deal specifically with 
compositions in letters or art,2 and the provisions relating 
to other forms of intellectual property and the limitation 
with respect to possession were deleted.3 Thus the amend-
ment made clear that the author's common law copyrights in 
a composition in letters or art are not dependent upon pos-
session of the composition or its expression or representation, 
but are only lost in the event of publication as provided in 
section 983 of the Civil Code. The statute now deals expressly 
with copyrights as distinct from rights of possession or owner-
ship of the original manuscript itself. ( Cf., Civ. Code, § 985.) 
Neither before nor after its 1947 amendment, however, did 
section 980 purport to define the extent to which property 
rights might exist in orig·inal ideas as distinct from their 
treatment and development. An expression or representation 
of an original composition might consist only in the statement 
of the general outline of the dramatic core or plot of a play 
or movie, or in the statement of a general plan for a radio 
1
'' The author of any product of the mind, whether it is an invention, 
or a composition in letters or art, or a design, with or without delineation, 
or other graphical representation, has an exclusive ownership therein, 
and in the representation or expression thereof, which continues so long 
as the product and the representations or expressions thereof made by 
him remain in his possession.' ' 
2
'' The author or proprietor of any composition in letters or art has an 
exclusive ownership in the representation or expression thereof as against 
all persons except one who originally and independently creates the same 
or a similar composition.'' 
3 A separate subdivision dealing with other forms of intellectual prop-
erty was added to section 980 in 1949. (Stats. 1949, ch. 921, § 1.) 
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program. (Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, Inc., s~tpra; Stanley 
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., supra.) Thus, if 
the Golding and Stanley cases were correctly decided, pro-
tection could be extended to the basic dramatic core of a play 
or the plan of a radio program under the present statute just 
as it was in those cases under the former. 
In my opinion, however, the court properly accepted the 
concession of the parties in the Stanley case that sections 
980 and 983, as formerly worded, were but codifications of the 
common law. The 1947 amendments to those sections, which 
antedated the decisions in the Stanley and Golding cases, 
merely clarified this fact by eliminating the language that 
might have been interpreted as making the duration of common 
law copyrights turn on possession rather than publication. 
Accordingly, the common law rule that ideas are not property, 
which the court now recognizes (Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, ante, 
p. 778 [256 P.2d 947]), should be applied in this case by 
holding that plaintiff has not stated a cause of action for 
plagiarism. 
From a comparison of the two programs it cannot be said 
as a matter of law that defendants have not used plaintiff's 
radio program idea. Although that idea is not property, it 
may be protected by an express or an implied-in-fact con-
tract. (Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, ante, p. 778 [256 P.2d 947]; 
Stanley v. Col1£mbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 
653, 674 [221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216]; dissent.) Since 
plaintiff has pleaded counts in both express and implied-in-
fact contract, I concur in the judgment to the extent that it 
reverses the order sustaining the demurrer to those counts. 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, ,T.--I dissent. 
I concur in the reversal of the judgment but I cannot 
concur in the greater part of the reasoning and law pro-
pounded in the majority opinion. 
It is stated by the majority that "Kurian's complaint shows 
that any property interest which McKenney may have had in 
either the story or characters of 'My Sister Eileen' has been 
lost by publication.'' The pleading shows that the story and 
characters were made public in a play, picture, magazines 
and books. It also shows that the stories had never been 
presented on the air and that by written agreement plaintiff's 
assignor had expressly reserved the sole and exclusive right 
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to use for radio broadcasting purposes these leading female 
characters. ''The owner of the common-law copyright bas a 
perpetual right of property and the exclusive right of first 
general publication, and may, prior thereto, enjoy the benefit 
of a restricted publication without forfeiture of the right of 
general publication. Thus, he may communicate the contents 
of his work under restrictions without forfeiture of the right. 
This communication of contents under re,striction, is known 
as a restricted or limited publication." (Emphasis added; 
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 147 F. 15, 18.) "A limited publi-
cation of a subject of copyright is one which communicates 
a knowledge of its contents under conditions expressly or im-
pliedly precluding its dedication to the public. Abernethy v. 
Hutchinson, 3 L.J.Ch. 209; Nichols v. Pitman, 26 L.R.Ch.Div. 
374; Caird v. Sime, 12 L.R.App.Cas. 326; Tomkins v. 
Halleck, 133 Mass. 32, 43 Am.Rep. 480; Palmer v. De Witt, 
47 N.Y. 532, 7 Am.Rep. 480; Turner v. Robinson, 10 Ir.Ch. 
Uep. 121, 135; Laura Keene v. Wheatley & Clarke, 9 Am.Law 
Reg. 33-80, Fed. Cas. No. 7,644." (W erckmeister v. American 
Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321 [69 C.C.A. 553, 68 L.R.A. 591]; 
Amdur, Copyright Law and Practice, pp. 354-356.) 
"It is well settled that the public performance of a dramatic 
or musical composition is merely a limited publication which 
does not confer upon the hearer or spectator any title to the 
manuscript, or any right to a copy which may have been ob-
tained surreptitiously, or which may have come into his pos-
session accidentally; because only a publication of the manu-
script will amount to an abandonment of the rights of the 
author and a consequent transfer of them to the public domain, 
and no s1wh publication occurs as long as the author exercises 
control over his manuscript, or has a right to such control. 
( Ct·owe v. Aiken, Fed. Cas. 3441; Koene v. Clark, 5 Robertson 
(28 N.Y. Super. Ct.) 38; Keene v. Kimball, 16 Gray (Mass.) 
G45, 77 Am.Dec. 426; Bmwn v. Perris, 122 Misc. 418, 204 
N.Y.S. 190.) Consequently a special public use of it by the 
author for his own benefit is no evidence of abandonment of 
his property therein, because such a use is entirely consistent 
with his exclusive right to its control. Thus, the reading, 
recital or stage representation of a manuscript play in public 
for profit, with the consent of the author, does not constitute 
any evidence of abandonment to the public of any rights 
arising from the authorship of the play; nor does it deprive 
him of his right to copyright the play. (Boucicault v. Fox, 
3 Fed.Cas. 977.) 
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''A ticket of admission merely entitles the holder to wit-
ness and enjoy a single exhibition of the play, without con-
ferring upon any member of the public the right to obtain 
surreptitiously the possession of the original manuscript for 
subsequent representation for profit, or to reproduce the 
eomposition from memory or from notes taken during the 
performance, in order to share in the earnings of its public 
presentation. If the atdhor of a play were not entitled to 
claim the protection of the law to secure to him the profits 
resulting from public performances of his composition, drama-
tists would soon cease to write plays for the amtrsement and 
entedainment of the public, unless subsidized by government 
or aided by private patronage: for the revenue derived from 
the sale of published copies of a popular drama would be 
negligible in comparison with the box-office receipts. ( W erck-
meister v. American Litho. Co., 134 F. 321 [69 C.C.A. 553, 
68 I.J.R.A. 591] .) 
''~Where an uncopyrighted and unprinted drama has been 
publicly performed at a theatre with the author's consent, 
no unlicensed person has a right to repeat the performance 
in a public theatre, or to publish copies of the dramatic com-
position, whether obtained surreptitiously or reproduced from 
memory after witnessing a performance thereof; for the 
a11thor's permission to act it at a public theatre does not 
runount to an abandonment of his title to it or to a dedica-
tion of it to the public; and the proprietor of the exclusive 
performing rights, or his assignee, by virtue of his common 
law r'ights, is ent1:tled to an 1"njtrnction restraining an un-
anthorized representation thereof. (Ferris v. Frohman, 223 
U.S. 424 [32 S.Ct. 263, 56 L.Ed. 492].) 
''Where the intent of the owner is to give the public merely 
a right to a limited use of his literary property or to use it 
in a particular way, the owner'R act does not constitute an 
abandonment of all hiR property; hut the public acquires a 
right to usc t"t only to the extent of the dedication. (Aronson 
v. Baker, 43 N .• T.Eq. 365, 12 A. 177.)" (Ball, Law of Copy-
right and Literary Property, 1944, § 61, p. 135.) (EmphasiR 
added.) 
It is common practice to reserve the dramatizing rights 
on the Rale of a book and these rights are respected and up-
held by the courtR (Ford v. Charles E. Blaney Amusement 
Co., 148 :F'. 642). Section 1 (b) of the 1909 Copyright Act 
expressly confers upon the copyright proprietor the exclusive 
right to transform the work by translation, dramatization, 
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adaptation, and by making other versions embodying material 
and substantial parts of the original in order to enable the 
author to reap the profits of his work in every field of in-
tellectual property in which it can be exploited advanta-
geously by vending copies or by public performance for profit 
(O'Neill v. General Film Co., 157 N.Y.S. 1028). This section 
has been literally construed by the courts to cover any adapta-
tion of a literary work which tells the same story as the 
original, whether the resulting drama be adapted for presen-
tation in the form of a stage play or for exhibition on the 
screen (Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros, 222 U.S. 55 [56 L.Ed. 92, 
Ann.Cas. 1913A 1285] ; International Film S. Co. v. Affi-
l1·atcd Distributors, 283 F. 229). 
For the purpose of the demurrer, all allegations of the 
complaint must be taken as true. It is alleged in the complaint 
here that on or about the 11th day of March, 1946, Ruth 
McKenney and plaintiff entered into an agreement in writing, 
wherein Ruth McKenney did grant to plaintiff the sole and 
exclusive right to use for radio broadcasting purposes the 
leading female characters created by her and featured or 
portrayed in ''said stories, stage play and motion picture 
entitled 'lJ!I y Sister Eileen,' and said Ruth McKenney did 
furthermore grant to said plaintiff Arthur Kurian all radio 
broadcasting rights therein and thereto which had theretofore 
been expr·essly reserved by said R1tth McKenney in connec-
tion with each and all of said prior licenses and uses of said 
r:hamcters in connection with said stories, play and motion 
picture hereinbefore mentioned." (Emphasis added.) It is 
further alleged that after the expiration of the original term 
of the agreement the time was extended by the parties, Ruth 
McKenney and plaintiff; that Ruth McKenney reserved and 
retained the right to receive royalties in connection with the 
production of any and all radio programs licensed under the 
agreement. Hence, plaintiff's assignor reserved all radio 
rights in the two leading characters, and it cannot be true, 
as is stated in the majority opinion, that ''as a matter of law, 
there is no protectible property in the 'basic dramatic core' 
of the story, its characters and their relationships, or the form 
and manner of its expression" because there has been a pub-
lication. The allegations of the complaint show that the 
publication was a limited one with certain rights reserved. 
It has been recognized that different types of rights may 
be reserved in literary works and that publication may be re-
stricted so as to preserve those rights. (See Manners v. Famous 
Apr. 1953] KuRLAN v. CoLUMBIA BRoADCASTING SYSTEM 819 
[40 C.2d 799; 256 P.2d 962] 
Players-Lasky Corp., 262 ]'. 811; L. C. Page & Co. v. Fo:r 
Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196; Gogniat v. Universal Pictures Corp., 
35 U.S. Pat.Q. 117; Cas'ino Productions v. Vitaphone Corp., 
163 Misc. 403 [295 N.Y.S. 501]; Society of European S.A.A.C. 
v. New York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F.Supp. 1; Gillette v. Stoll 
li'ilm Co., 120 Misc. 850 [200 N.Y.S. 787] ; Benelli v. Hopkins, 
198 Misc. 734 [103 N.Y.S.2d 526] ; G. Ricordi & Co., v. Para-
mount Pictures, 189 F.2d 469, cert.den. 342 U.S. 849 [72 S.Ct. 
77, 96 L.Ed. 641] .) 
At the time Kurian's cause of action arose, § 980 of the 
Civil Code provided protection for ''any product of the mind 
... and in the representation or expression thereof.'' (Em-
phasis added.) The majority says, however, that the two 
leading characters involved were unoriginal and unworthy of 
protection inasmuch as any property right in them had been 
lost by publication. As I have heretofore stated, it is my 
opinion that the publication was a limited one, with the radio 
rights expressly reserved and that there was a protectible 
property interest involved. The statute reads, for our purposes, 
as it did when this court decided Golding v. R.K.O. Pictures, 
Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690 [221 P.2c1 95 J, wherein a basic, dramatic 
core with one important dramatic figure was held to constitute 
a protectible interest. 
Characters and characterizations which are products of the 
mind should be held to be protectible property interests. The 
radio industry is a large one, and radio programs are fre-
quently based upon a single character, personality or char-
acterization. To illustrate the extremely valuable theatrical-
radio properties which are in existence one only must look 
as far as the radio column in his daily paper to note the 
programs, built around a single character, or family, which 
continue from day to day, week to week, and year to year.* It 
should be apparent to even the least intelligent that these 
programs are as valuable as the most gilt-edged security listed 
on the Stock Exchange. No court would hesitate to extend its 
protection to the lawful owner of a security, and yet equally 
*Sherlock Holmes; The Thin Man; The Fat Man; Michael Shane; 
Count of Monte Cristo; Crime Doctor; The Whistler; Mr. District At-
torney; A Date with Judy; Adventures of Bulldog Drummond; Ad-
ventures of Ellery Queen; Adventures of the Falcon; Jack Armstrong; 
Blondie; Captain Midnight; The Lone Ranger; Stella Dallas; Ma 
Perkins; The Great Gildersleeve; Perry Mason; Superman; Young Dr. 
Malone; The Cisco Kid; Fibber McGee and Molly; Mr. and Mrs. North; 
One Man's Family; The Aldrich Family; Amos 'n' Andy; Edgar Bergen 
and Charlie McCarthy; Burns and Allen; and many others. 
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valuable ''character-types'' are not given the same protection. 
It is surely a subject of jud ieial notiee that California is the 
center of the motion picture industry of the world and if its 
laws are inadequate for the protection of the individual cre-
ative writer who must find a market for his work, then those 
laws should be amended. It is axiomatic that the movie indus-
try could not exist without the writer and yet, if the present 
trend continues, the writer will vanish from the scene. 'l'he 
same is true of the radio industry. A writer submits his work 
to either industry in the hope and rightful expectation that 
if his work is used, he will be paid its value, but, under pres-
ently existing conditions, and court decisions, these industries 
may make minor changes in the play, or manuscript, and 
escape liability and any obligation to pay any consideration 
therefor. As Goldsmith wrote (Enquiry into the Present 
State of Polite Learning) as an epitaph to the memory of his 
friend, Ned Purdon, an author: 
''Here lies poor Ned Purdon, from misery freed, 
vVho long was a bookseller's hack; 
He led such a damnable life in this world, 
I don't think he'll wish to come back!'' 
The statement attributed to Stanley v. Columbia Broad-
casting System, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 653 [221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 
216], found in the majority opinion here is misleading so far 
as this case is concerned. That statement is ''Kurian's radio 
prog-ram idea was to capitalize upon a famous and successful 
story, play and motion picture by producing it on the radio. 
The court may take judicial notice of the fact that there is 
nothing new and novel in this idea which might constitute 
protectible property." We said there that there was "nothing 
new in a play broadcast over the air.'' There is nothing new 
in a play broadcast over the air, but there is something new 
in a play broadcast by someone else over the air for the first 
time if the author of that play has reserved the radio rights 
thereto, because the play is being used in a medium new to it. 
'rhe Stanley case was not concerned with the broadcasting 
rights in a play; it was concerned with a combination of ideas 
which was being used for the first time in a certain way and 
the originator of that combination of ideas, with the permis-
sion of the author of the new play, was suing the broadcasting 
system. 
Section 426 ( 3) of the Code of Civil Procedure now pro-
vides that the copy of the production as to which the infringe-
ment is claimed and a copy of the alleged infringing produc-
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tion must be attached to the complaint. This permits the trial 
court, upon demurrer, to decide in the first instance whether 
or not there is similarity between the two productions. Here-
tofore, the question of similarity has been considered to be one 
of fact (Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 35 
Cal.2d 653 [221 P.2d 73, 23 A.L.R.2d 216] ; Golding v. R.K.O. 
Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690 [221 P.2d 95] ; Kovacs v. Mutual 
Broadcasting System, Inc., 99 Cal.App.2d 56 [221 P.2d 108]; 
Fmnkel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142; Twentieth Century-Fox Film 
Corp. v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 893), and the test to be that 
impression received by the average reasonable man upon a 
comparative reading of the two works. There should be no 
change in the test to be used under the new code section. It 
should still be that of the reasonable man. In other words, 
if reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not there is 
simila,rity between the two works, then the question is still one 
of fact for the jury. 
In the play "My Sister Eileen," Ruth, as narrator, is a 
young, attractive, intelligent working girl who is the unwilling 
victim of a succession of difficulties created by her sister, 
Eileen, with whom she lives because "apartments are hard to 
find in New York." Ruth is the balancewheel for her com-
pletely thoughtless, impulsive, scatterbrained sister, Eileen. 
Eileen is hopelessly unable to hold a job and has had six of 
them within four months. She has no financial sense and never 
has any money because she spends every cent she has on 
"junk" which everybody seems to be able to sell her. She 
nses the common exchequer and family funds without Ruth's 
knowledge or consent and makes life unbearable for Ruth with 
her scatterbrained schemes ; embarrasses Ruth by ridiculous 
lies told without malice or intent to creat mischief but with 
rvery desire to help her sister and roommate. Ruth and 
Eileen are from Ohio. Ruth has acquired some city "sophisti-
ration" while Eileen has nat and remains completely naive. 
Rnth's supposed fiance, Claude, is described as a blustering 
"braggart," but she is in love with a serious, intelligent busi-
nessman, Lloyd Carter. 
Jane, in the radio production "My Friend Irma," as nar-
rator, is a serious, intelligent working girl from Wyoming who 
has aequired a certain amount of city ''sophistication.'' She 
lives with her "friend Irma" because apartments are "hard 
to find these days.'' Jane is in love with a serious, intelligent 
businessman, Richard Rhinelander III. Irma is gay, careless, 
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impulsive, thoughtless and completely lacking in sophistica-
tion ; she causes Jane endless difficulties because of her scatter-
brained schemes. Irma's boy friend, AI, is described as a 
"phony windbag." In this program, as in the play "My 
Sister Eileen" there is an eccentric landlady. 
In conjunction with the similarities just set forth, attention 
is called to the summary of the two productions as set forth in 
the majority opinion. It cannot be said, as a matter of law, 
that there is no similarity between the two. The briefs show 
that in describing the radio program entitled "My Friend 
Irma," the New York Herald-Tribune, on March 22, 1948, 
stated in a dramatic criticism and review of the program: 
''The centr·al idea, that of two young girl roommates, one 
bright, the other one almost intolerably innocent of all knowl-
edge, was taken almost intact from a very funny play entitled 
'My Sister Eileen.'" (Emphasis added.) The question of 
similarity between the two productions is most assuredly one 
on which reasonable minds might differ as can be seen from 
the above quoted dramatic review and the fact that three 
justices of the District Court of Appeal (see (Cal.App.) 233 
P .2d 936) as well as myself feel that within the common 
knowledge of the average reader, observer, spectator or listener 
there are sufficient similarities to induce the belief that copying 
has taken place. It is true that there are differences between 
the two programs, but as Mr. Justice Edmonds said in the 
Golding case ''such differences go to the quality of the plagiar-
ism, and not to its existence or nonexistence." ( Goldirng v. 
R.K.O. P1:ct1u·es, Inc., 35 Cal.2d 690, 699 [221 P.2d 95] .) 
No test other than the reasonable minds one has ever been 
laid down for determining the question of similarity between 
the alleged infringed and infringing productions and there 
is no reason why, in determining the matter upon a demurrer, 
the trial court should apply any other rule. As I read the 
majority opinion in this case and in that of W eitzenkorn v. 
Lesser, ante, p. 778 [256 P.2d' 947] (this day filed) I do 
not find that any test has been proposed other than that of 
"substantial similarity." In W eitzenkorn v. Lesser, supra, it 
is said ''if some substantial similarity between the composi-
tions reasonably could be found, the issues of similarity and 
of copying are to be determined by the trier of the fact'' and 
in the instant case it is said that "If, from a comparison of 
the productions, a question of fact is shown to exist, the cause 
should be submitted to the jury.'' In my opinion, these state-
ments are not the equivalent of saying that the question is 
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one for the jury if reasonable minds could differ one whether 
or not the two prodnctions are similar. 
I would reverse the judgment with directions to the trial 
court to overrule the demurrer as to all counts and permit de-
fendants to answer if they be so advised. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 28, 
1953. Carter, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22215. In Bank. Apr. 29, 1953.] 
THOMSON BUR'fiS, Respondent. v. UNIVERSAI.J PIC-
TURES COMPANY, INC. (a Corporation) et al., Ap-
pellants. 
[1] Literary Property-Evidence.-In action for unauthorized use 
of literary property, a judgment for plaintiff is not sustained 
by evidence that he first wrote an outline synopsis designed 
for development into a motion picture script, which was sub-
mitted to defendant motion picture company; that on the 
basis of this synopsis plaintiff and defendant entered into 
an agreement under which plaintiff was to complete an orig-
inal story suitable for a motion picture and defendant was 
granted an option to purchase the story for a designated sum; 
that the story, on its completion, was delivered to defendant, 
which did not exercise the option and which retained both 
the synopsis and the story; and that defendant some years 
later produced a picture based on the same basic theme, where 
a comparison of the story and the motion picture shows no 
similarity between them as to form and manner of expression. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Henry M. Willis, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
Action for damages for unauthorized use of literary prop-
erty. Judgment for plaintiff reversed with directions. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Literary Property; Am.Jur., Literary Prop-
erty and Copyright, § 66 et seq. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Literary Property. 
